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BOOK REVIEWS
A Concise History of the Common Law. By Theodore F. T.
Plucknett. Rochester, New York. The Lawyers Co6perative
Publishing-Co. 1929.
This is a book of very real importance. In the first place the
author is a person of unusual competence. As a member of the
faculty of Harvard Law School for the past few years he has
carried on practically single handed the legal history work of
that institution and has made it a leader in that branch of study.
A text book by such an author can hardly fail to have both merit
and importance.
Furthermore the book is significant in its relationship to
other works on the same subject. It is consciously intended to
supplement and be supplemented by Pound and Plucknett "Readings on the History and System of the Common Law," the third
edition of which, largely revised by Professor Plucknett,
appeared as recently as 1927. In the Readings will be found
set forth at length primary material referred to in the Concise
History, whereas the material in the Readings will often be
explained and supplemented by the Concise History. The two
books may therefore profitably be studied together.
Furthermore the Concise History has a considerable number
of references to Holdsworth. Everyone knows that Holdsworth
is the ultimate authority in English legal history. But no one
who has attempted to use his work will have failed to find out
that it consists of nine large volumes almost without arrangement and practically without indexing. Professor Plucknett's
work is as well arranged and indexed as the older work is ill
equipped with these essentials; and it may reasonably be expected that the smaller book will have as one of its important
functions to serve as an introduction and guide to Holdsworth.
One definite characteristic of its author appears on nearly
every page of the Concise History. Professor Plucknett is firmly
convinced that the Middle Ages were quite superior to the present, at least so far as legal matters are concerned. Indeed he
has comparatively little interest in modern times as is shown by
the fact that he concludes the first part of the book "The Crown
and the State," dealing with the relationship of political history
to legal development, with the close of the 18th century. No
connected references are made to the enormous legal developments of the 19th century although there are some indirect
references to the procedural reforms of the '70s and some similar
matters in other connections.
However, one need look no further than the book itself to
realize that distance in time as well as space is likely to lend enchantment to the view. When one examines the actual conditions
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in the Middle Ages, as they are here clearly set forth, one does
not share the author's enthusiasm for that distant period. For
example, we are told that legal procedure in the Middle Ages
was far superior to that of the present because there was no
oratory and no pedantry. The courts kept themselves in a
strictly business attitude. "It is only after the Renaissance that
we find the bad old classical tradition of Greece and Rome which
turned law-suits into an oratorical contest appearing in England." (p. 152.)
This sounds well enough, but the author immediately goes on
to say that the serjeants who conducted most of the court proceedings in England at this time were rarely informed by their
own clients of the actual facts of the case which they were expected to argue. The result was that two or more serjeants
might argue for hours before the court and then discover that
their whole controversy had nothing to do with the actual case.
In view of this example of medieval "practicality" one is inclined
to feel that present day court procedure with all of its improper
submission "to the bad old classical tradition" is not wholly an
example of modern decadence.
The author furthermore has considerable sympathy with the
feeling of medieval lawyers that the English language was not
proper for legal reports. As is well known the language used
in the Year Books and Abridgements was the so-called Law
French, a mixture of the French and English languages with a
sort of legal jargon belonging to no language. Fortescue is
quoted (though it should be said without approval) as stating
that the French of the Year Books was superior to that used in
France itself-a statement which would certainly be tragic as
exemplifying the intellectual ruin of medieval legalism, if it
were not so gloriously funny. The truth of the matter is that
the use of Law French was an exaggerated piece of legal
pedantry and while unfortunately such pedantry did not die
with the Middle Ages it is certainly much less prominent and
vicious than it was then.
Professor Plucknett also admires the freedom with which the
governing classes of medieval times dealt with statutes. A
statute was simply a registration of royal will and needed no
enacting body other than the King himself, with or without the
advice of his Council as he chose. Besides, the judges while
they clearly had no particular theory on the subject had felt
entirely justified in interpreting statutes as they thought fit or
even entirely disregarding them. The author thus sums up the
situation (p. 291) : "The great concern of the government was
to govern, and if in the course of its duties legislation became
necessary, then it was effected simply and quickly without any
complications or formalitieS."
This too sounds very well until one reflects that it is only these
"complications and formalities" which have insured any rights
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to persons not belonging to the governing classes. The medieval
scheme presupposes that the persons having such enormous
power will use it for the benefit of the community in general
rather than for their own; and unfortunately both the ordinary
facts of human nature and the testimony of history (especially
medieval history) prove that this supposition is almost entirely
false. The fearful injustices which were perpetrated in connection with the purchase and sale of wardships over infant heirs,
all of which is set forth in this book, is a sufficient proof that
self-interest in the Middle Ages needed just as it does now some
pretty carefully devised governmental machinery to keep it in
check. Our more elaborate machinery which Professor Plucknett
does not like has very many defects no doubt, but it does measurably succeed in performing this function.
A further rather amusing example of the same point of view
is the author's account of the action of debt which he correctly
states was regarded in the medieval period as based not upon
a contract but upon a grant, "an ancient idea which is not easy
to grasp at the present day when the intense realism of medieval
thought and philosophy is no longer familiar."
(pp. 408-9.)
But only a little further down he apparently abandons his faith
in this "intense realism" for he points out that by the beginning
of the 16th century the idea was getting to look rather artificial.
The fact of the matter is, and the book points it out, that this
highly metaphysical cast of the medieval mind greatly checked
the development of our law of contracts so that it was centuries
behind that of any other law.
Much more might be cited to show the enthusiasm of the
author for the medieval period, but paradoxial though it may
seem, this has not in any way caused him to lose sight of the
most recent developments of historical research. For example it
is pointed out that the present view is that the action on the
case was not based on the Statute of Westminster II. This is certainly quite different from what most law students were taught,
at least until very recently.
Another distinct contribution is with respect to the Year
Books. It is pointed out that they cannot be properly considered
as a unit-that during their long period they constantly and
quite fundamentally changed their scope and character. This
new point of view is a long step in advance in the study of these
puzzling but important works.
With respect to the history of real estate law there are several
important contributions. The author spends much time in arguing that the origin of the entail must be sought in the mantagium, a much older institution, which also, it may be added,
seems to have had considerable influence on curtesy. He is
avowedly promulgating a hypothesis rather than an indisputable historical fact; nevertheless his argument seems quite convincing. He also outlines the somewhat revolutionary theory
with respect to terms for years recently promulgated by Jouon
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des Longrais, who explains the poor protection which the termor
had in former times not by the fact that he was a person of
small consequence but rather that he was usually a dishonest
person or at least a usurer. We have also here a fairly adequate
explanation of the history of the much controverted word "mortgage", which grew up in contradistinction to the "vifgage."
Littleton, who lived after vifgage had disappeared, started the
misconception as to the precise meaning of the word "mortgage",
which still persists.
There are, however, certain points made as to which there
may well be doubt. For instance Lord Holt is given the credit
for urging the Statute of Anne making promissory notes negotiable. The truth seems to be that no such statute was needed
except for the stupid conservatism of Lord Holt himself. The
author also attempts to defend the courts for not permitting a
use on a use immediately after the Statute of Uses; but was not
this after all merely a hang-over of medieval metaphysics?
The book is divided into two main divisions, the general and
the special part. Of these the general part is much the longer
and, as its name suggests, of somewhat more general interest.
The first subdivision of this is entitled "The Crown and the
State." It has already been pointed out that this subdivision
ends before the close of the 18th century but with this limitation
it is an admirable summary of the political and economic aspects
of legal history.
The next subdivision is entitled "The Courts and the Profession." Particular attention is given to the development of the
central courts and to their relation with the local and feudal
courts. The book emphasizes that the royal courts developed
not only from administrative institutions but often merely from
offices in the royal household. The problem of fitting in the
system of royal courts with the already existing local and
feudal courts was for centuries a very difficult one and it is
shown that even the jury developed from this interplay of local
and central institutions. There is also contained in this part
an excellent history of the development of the legal profession
in England to which is appended a characterization of some of
the more important common law judges. The final chapter in
the subdivision deals with professional literature. It is emphasized that professional literature has had a no inconsiderable
effect in moulding the law itself. For example, Bracton's use
of cases, though this was very far from the modern idea of
precedents, yet was the first and a definite step in that direction.
American lawyers will be interested to note the high opinion of
Blackstone and particularly of his influence on American law
which is expressed by the author.
The next subdivision relates to "External Forces." These are
the civil law, the canon law, the law merchant, and equity. No
comment is necessary except to say that in each case we have
an admirable brief summary of the development of these various
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doctrines. The chapter on equity contains characterizations of
a number of the more important Chancellors of England.
The general part closes with a subdivision entitled "The
Methods of Progress." These are also four in number, as follows: custom, forms of action, legislation, and precedents. At
first glance the characterization of this subdivision seems peculiar. One ordinarily thinks of legislation as a progressive element but custom is not generally so regarded and certainly the
principle of precedents and the forms of action are normally
considered among the most reactionary elements of our law.
Nevertheless the author seems to sustain his point. It is shown
that the word "custom" was used in the Middle Ages in a rather
peculiar sense, which has almost a legislative significance. Thus
we find certain municipalities adopting the "customs" of other
municipalities. It is obvious therefore that custom was originally a very flexible thing and could and did represent a very
progressive element in our law. That it no longer does so is
not of great significance except as a rather sardonic commentary
upon the ideas of those who still think that our modern law
should be governed by ancient custom.
As to the forms of action it is only necessary to point out the
well-known fact that they developed in the interplay of the royal
central courts upon the older local and feudal courts. In that
respect they are unquestionably an important method of developing the common law, though their usefulness in this respect
is, of course, long since past. As already said, legislation started
out as a rather informal matter not even needing the consideration of the Council, let alone Parliament. Such, for instance, was
the important Statute of Mortmain (1279) which was merely
an executive order to the justices. The author expresses surprise that royal licenses to violate this statute were so common
but this would seem to be perfectly natural in view of the form
of this statute. It would certainly arouse no comment that what
the king had given he could also take away.
The other main subdivision of the book called the Special
Part has only two subdivisions, one relating to real property and
the other to contracts. The part relating to real property takes
up in some detail the feudal system and its results in connection
with real property law, entails, uses and trusts (with detailed
discussion of the statute development of this subject in both its
political and legal aspects), and conveyances. The history of
our rather tardy development of our law of contracts is much
more briefly covered. The author notes that our contract law
grew out of torts; it may be that we are today witnessing the
reverse of that process in that tort law seems to be extending
over the entire field formerly covered by contracts.
The book concludes with an exhortation which is certainly of
enormous significance coming from a person so- wrapped up in
past history as is our author. He suggests that the only practical function of the study of legal history is to enable us to

BOOK REVIEWS

bring our own law up to date and in accordance with present
day conditions. To this the reviewer feels like adding his hearty
"Amen."
On the whole and despite certain criticisms which can properly be made against this book it must be considered to be an
admirable piece of work; it is far more detailed and also more
stimulating than could be reasonably expected from a work of
its comparatively small bulk. To anyone interested in the historical development of our law from any aspect whatever, this
book is more than useful-it is practically indispensable.
ROBERT C. BROWN.
Indiana University School of Law.
Law and the Modern Mind. By Jerome Frank. New York:
Brentano's. 1930. 362 pages. Price $4.00.
"The basic myth" of juristic thinking is that legal certainty
and absolute predictability are somewhat attainable. This myth
is believed by the profession and the laity alike. It has its roots
in "a yearning for something unreal.". For an explanation of
that yearning we turn to psychology, which takes us back to
our childhood. There, before our mentality was of sufficient
strength to be skeptical about the expressed thoughts of our
fathers, we found in them the ultimate and absolute. We developed a father-complex, which we have never outgrown; we have
simply substituted law for father. Unfortunately most of us
are not aware of that complex; hence, the myth: we accept an
untruth-legal certainty-as though it were true, and we do
not know that it is not true.
That legal certainty is not a reality, of course, needs explanation, which is effected by an elaboration upon two quotations,
one from Judge Cuthbert W. Pound and one from Mr. Justice
Holmes. "The decision consists in what is done, not what is said
by the court in doing it. Every decision must be read with
regard to the facts in the case and the question actually decided."
In rendering a judgment a court writes an opinion, usually stating principles which it says govern and control the judgment;
but the force of principles "lies in the application of them and,
this application cannot be predicted with accuracy." In the
functions of fact-finding and applying of principles the individuality of the judge makes a far greater inroad upon the lawmaking process than has generally been supposed. "General
propositions do not decide concrete cases ;" and any seeming cer.tainty apparent in the general principles of judicial opinions is
illusory. The law is what a judge decides as to a particular
situation. This definition of law is "legal realism," as opposed
to "legal fundamentalism" or "Bealism" (after Professor Joseph
Henry Beale), which conceives of law as a "uniform, general,
continuous, equal, certain, pure" system, which is "truly law
even though no court has lent its sanction to many of its principles."

